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Appellant David C. Juricic (hereinafter "Mr. Juricic"),by and through 
his counsel of record, David J. Holdsworth, submits the following as his Opening 
Brief: 
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A BRIEF STATEMENT SHOWING THE JURISDICTION OF 
THE APPELLATE COURT: 
§ 78A-4-103 (2) (j) of the Utah Code. 
A STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND INCLUDING FOR EACH ISSUE THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW WITH SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: 
ISSUE NO. 1: Did the District Court err in deciding that 
AutoZone's requirement that its employees comply with its dress code which 
required employees to wear clothing of a distinctive design and color was not 
tantamount to requiring AutoZone employees to wear a uniform? 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: 
As to appellate review of a trial court's conclusions of law, the 
correctness standard is applicable . The Court accords no deference to the trial court's 
determinations of law and reviews the issues under a correctness standard. Orton v. 
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998), K&T, Inc. v. Korvlis, 888 P.2d 623,627 
(Utah 1994). This standard applies to the issue of whether a party was entitled to a 
summary judgment. Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999). 
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Citation to the Record Showing that the Issue was Preserved in the Trial 
Court: This issue was fully briefed by the parties. R. at 31-285. 
CITATIONS TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
RULES OR CASES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE 
APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANT TO THE APPEAL: 
Utah Code Annotated § 34-28-1, et seq. 
- Utah Administrative Code Rule, R610-3-21. Uniforms. 
A. Where the wearing of uniforms is a 
condition of employment, the employer shall 
furnish the uniforms free of charge. 
1. The term "uniform" includes any 
article of clothing, footwear, or 
accessory of a distinctive design or 
color required by an employer to be 
worn by employees. 
2. An article of clothing which is 
associated with a specific employer 
by virtue of an emblem (logo) or 
distinctive color scheme shall be 
considered a uniform. 
B. The employer may request an 
amount, not to exceed the actual cost of the 
uniform or $20, whichever is less, as a deposit on 
each uniform required by the employer. The 
deposit shall be refunded to the employee at the 
time the uniform is returned. 
ISSUE NO. 2: Did the District Court err in deciding that 
AutoZonefs policy of allowing AutoZone employees to accrue vacation pay as 
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part of their compensation package but imposing a "use it or lose it" feature as 
to such vacation pay, did not violate Utah law? 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: 
The correctness standard is applicable to appellate review of a trial 
court's conclusions of law. The Court accords no deference to the trial court's 
determinations of law and reviews the issues under a correctness standard. Orton v. 
Carter. 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). K&T. Inc. v. Korvlis. 888 P.2d 623, 627 
(Utah 1994). This standard applies to the issue of whether a party was entitled to a 
summary judgment. Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Utah Ct. App 
1999). 
Citation to the Record Showing that the Issue was Preserved in the Trial 
Court: This issue was fully briefed by the parties. R. at 31-285. 
CITATIONS TO CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
RULES OR CASES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE 
APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANT TO THE APPEAL: 
Utah Code Annotated § 34-28-2 (4). "Wages" means all amounts due 
to the employee for labor or services, whether the amount is fixed or 
ascertained on a time, task, piece, commission basis or other method of 
calculating such amount. 
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- IJ tail Administrative Code R i lie 610-3-4 (B) (1) which provides that the 
term "wages also includes the following items if due under an 
agreement with the employer or under a policy of the employer: a. 
vacation; b. holiday; c. sick leave; d. paid time off; and e. severance 
payments and bonuses." 
- In addition, the Utah Labor Commission's "Frequently Asked 
Questions" web page provides the following guidance: 
Q: Is an employer required to provide paid 
vacation, holiday pay, sick leave or 
severance pay? 
A: In general, Utah labor law does not 
require an employer to provide benefits to 
its employees. If an employer does establish 
a policy or practice of providing benefits, 
they are expected to abide by the policy or 
practice in a non-discriminatory manner. 
ISSUE NO. 3: Did the District Court err in deciding that 
AutoZone's policy of not allowing AutoZone employees to work for a 
competitor while off the clock and off the AutoZone premises, did not violate 
Utah law? 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: 
The correctness standard is applicable to appellate review of a trial 
court's conclusions of law. The Court accords no deference to the trial court's 
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determinations of law and reviews the issues under a correctness standard. Orton v. 
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998). K&T, Inc. v. Korvlis. 888 P.2d 623, 627 
(Utah 1994). This standard applies to the issue of whether a party is entitled to a 
summary judgment. Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999). 
Citation to the Record Showing that the Issue was Preserved in the Trial 
Court: This issue was fully briefed by the parties. R. at 31-285. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
REGULATIONS AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS 
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO 
THE APPEAL: Appellant is not aware of any statutes or regulations which bear on 
this issue. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
David Juricic worked for AutoZone, Inc. ("Autozone"), from 1997 to 
2008 as an auto parts sales person. During the period Mr. Juricic was employed with 
AutoZone, AutoZone adopted a dress code. This dress code required AutoZone 
employees to wear a red knit golf shirt with a collar, black pants, black socks, black 
shoes and a black belt while at work. Autozone required its employees to purchase 
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articles of clothing which complied with this dress code. Mr. Juricic came lo believe 
that such requirement and dress code requiring him to wear articles of clothing of a 
distinctive design and color/color scheme was tantamount to AutoZone imposing a 
requirement to wear a uniform and filed a civil action asking for a declaratory 
judgment as to whether he should be forced to pay for the cost of such clothing or 
whether AutoZone should have to pay for the cost of such clothing. 
In said action seeking a declaratory judgment, he also requested the trial 
court to declare whether AutoZone's policy on vacation pay, which allowed 
employees to accrue vacation hours but required employees to use such vacation 
hours in a given year or lose such hours (Autozone dictated that employees could not 
carry more than 40 hours of unused paid vacation from year to year) violated Utah 
law. 
In said declaratory judgment action, Mr. Juricic also requested the trial 
court to declare whether AutoZone's policy against moonlighting for a competitor 
after hours and off premises, violated Utah law. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT BELOW 
AND DISPOSITION 
After discovery, AutoZone filed a motion for summary judgment. R. at 
31-32. The parties fully briefed the issues and submitted the issues to the trial court. 
R. at 33-285. On January 3, 2009, the trial court entered a memorandum decision 
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declaring that AutoZone's dress code did not impose the requirement of wearing a 
"uniform" within the contemplation of the Utah Administrative Code, that 
AutoZone's "use it or lose it" policy relating to accrued vacation hours did not violate 
Utah law, and that AutoZone's policy prohibiting its employees from moonlighting 
for a competitor after hours and off premises did not violate Utah law. R. at 288-291, 
R. at 292-294. This appeal ensued. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Background 
L David Juricic was first employed with AutoZone in late 
Spring or early Summer of 1997. Deposition of David Juricic (hereafter 
"Juricic Depo.") at p. 19, line 21 top. 20, line 4. R. at 34, 57-58. 
2. Juricic worked primarily for AutoZone as an auto parts 
store salesperson, but he also did some parts delivery work. Juricic Depo. at p. 
22, lines 16-25; p. 23, lines 1-5. R. at 34, 58. 
3. Juricic worked for AutoZone for eleven years, voluntarily 
retiring in July of 2008. Juricic Depo. at p. 20, lines 5-18. R. at 34, 58. 
AutoZone's Dress Code Policy 
4. When Juricic was first employed with AutoZone, the 
AutoZone dress code required Juricic to wear a red knit golf shirt with an 
AutoZone logo, black pants, black socks, black shoes and a black belt. 
AutoZone provided the shirt at no cost to him. Juricic had to supply the rest of 
the clothes needed to meet the dress code. Juricic Depo. at p. 33, line 2 to p. 
34, line 4; p. 34, line 10 to p. 35, line 1. R. at 34, 61-63. 
5. When he was first employed there, Juricic already owned 
black pants, black socks, black shoes and a black belt. Juricic Depo. at p. 35, 
line 13 to p. 36, line 23, p. 63, line 8 to p. 64, line 5. R. at 34, 63-64. 
6. Within a few years of when Juricic started working there, 
probably early in the year 2000, AutoZone issued Juricic an Employee 
Handbook. Juricic Depo. at p. 43, line 20 to p. 45, line 1. R. at 34, 69-71, 
119-183. 
7. This Employee Handbook changed the AutoZone dress 
code by requiring employees to wear a red knit golf shirt but without an 
AutoZone logo on it, and to pay for the red shirt themselves, rather than 
having AutoZone pay for it. The new dress code also continued to require 
employees to wear and provide their own black pants, black socks, black shoes 
and a black belt. Employees could buy these clothes wherever they wished to 
do so. Juricic Depo. at p. 38, line 22 to p. 39, line 25; p. 49, line 15 to p. 50, 
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line 21; p. 45, line 15 to p.57, line 24; p. 60, line 12 top. 61, line 7. R. at 35, 
65-66, 75, 71, 83, 84-85 and R. at 185-189. 
8. A full and complete description of why Juricic believes 
the Autozone new dress code is improper is in papers he drafted, which read as 
follows: 
Noncompliance. 
Failure to comply with the dress code can 
result in termination of employment. This 
policy is the definition of extortion under 
Utah State law. You are required to buy and 
wear clothing items, for AutoZonefs benefit, 
or you will be fired. Also you are required 
to purchase AutoZone logo items through its 
required supplier. 
* * * 
Let's start on page 9 and go to page 13. On 
this page the Uniform (Dress Code) is 
clearly defined by color and style. It notes 
that the clothing worn is for the benefit of 
AutoZone. The Utah State Labor 
Commission on uniforms states that if 
clothing is of a distinctive color or logo and 
is required for employment it is a uniform 
and must be paid for by the employer. 
Clearly page 9-13 notes this. This is the 
definition of uniform under Utah State 
Labor Commission regulation. AutoZone 
and the State Labor Commission would 
have you believe that since the items can be 
worn outside work that the regulation is not 
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valid. Nowhere in the regulation does it 
mention if a uniform can be worn outside 
work, or where it can be bought, is a part of 
the judgement on whether it is a uniform. 
Yet these were deciding factors in my 
denial. 
{Emphasis in original) Juricic Depo. at p. 47, line 5 to p. 48, line 4; p. 48, line 
8 to p. 49, line 14. R. at 35-36, 73-75, 191-198. 
9. Juricic did not like or agree with the new AutoZone dress 
code and wrote several letters to AutoZone asking it to pay for the clothes he 
had to purchase and wear at work. AutoZone declined his request. Juricic 
Depo, .it p. 69, line 8 to p. 70, line 13. R. at 36, 90-91, R. at 200-209. 
10. In December of 2002, Juricic filed a wage claim with the 
Utah Labor Commission, Antidiscrimination and Labor Division (UALD), 
asserting that the AutoZone dress code was a uniform as defined by Utah 
Labor Commission regulations. He sought reimbursement for the cost of 
buying red golf shirts, black pants, etc. Juricic Depo. at p. 12, lines 5-25; p. 
95, lines 16-22. R. at 36, 56, 110, R. at 211-217. 
11. On April 3, 2003, after a hearing held on March 11, 2003, 
a UALD hearing officer issued a written decision concluding that the 
AutoZone dress code did not mandate the wearing of a uniform as defined by 
Utah Labor Commission regulations and dismissing Juricicfs claim. Juricic 
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Depo. at p. 66, line I to p. 67, line 21; p. 98, lines 11-20; p. 99, line 25 to p. 
100. line 15. R. at 36, 87, 11-113, R. at 219-223. 
12. Juricic appealed this adverse ruling to the UALD 
Executive Director, who agreed with the hearing officer and, on April 30, 
2003, affirmed such ruling. Juricic Depo. at p. 103, line I to p. 104, line 10. 
R. at 37, 114-115, R. at 225-227 and 229-231. 
13. Juricic appealed this adverse ruling to the Utah Third 
District Court. He believed the Utah Labor Commission's decision was 
contrary to its rule on uniforms. Judge Iwasaki dismissed this appeal on 
December 8, 2004 for failure to prosecute. Juricic Depo. at p. 104, line 11 to 
p. 105, line 22; p. 117, lines 6-13. R. at 37, 115-116, R. at 233-235. 
14. Juricic chose to stay employed with AutoZone even 
though he did not agree with the AutoZone dress code. Juricic Depo. at p. 46, 
line 22 to p.47, line 4; p.70, line 5 top. 71, line 1. R. at 37, 72-73, 91. 
AutoZonefs Vacation: Use-It-Or-Lose-It Policy 
15. From the time Juricic started working at Autozone, or 
shortly thereafter, AutoZone permitted employees to accrue vacation hours/pay 
but with a use-it-or-lose-it feature, allowing employees to only carry over up to 
about 40 hours of unused paid vacation time from one year to the next. If an 
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employee did not use any accrued vacation hours over 40 hours in a given 
year, such an employee would lose those hours. Juricic Depo. at p. 41, lines 
10-19; p. 42, lines 11-22. R. at 37-38, 67-68, 94-95, R. at 237. 
16. A full and complete description of why Juricic believes 
AutoZone's "use-it-or-lose-it" policy on vacation hours is improper is in papers 
he drafted, which read as follows: 
Page 54. Vacation Carry Over. You may 
only carry over a maximum of 40 hours past 
March l'st. Yeah right. Anything over 40 
hours is wiped off your record. Like Theft 
of Services can be made Legal. You have 
worked the prescribed contract, but now 
they can decide not to pay you based on a 
contract regulation. Once you have earned 
the hours they have to pay you. Taking 
money from you after you have fulfilled a 
contract, without your consent is illegal and 
a felony. According to AutoZone, just 
putting the requirement in a contract is 
justified for taking the money from you 
without your consent. Theft, and Theft of 
Services is illegal. 
* * # 
Carry over. 
You may carry over a maximum of 40 
Hours past March l'st. Known as Use-It-Or-
Lose-It. There is no way a company can 
deny payment for performance completed 
under any contract. This is Breach-Of-
12 
Contract for failure to pay for services 
performed and also Theft-Of-Services under 
contract law. Neither of which are legal. 
* * * 
AutoZone will not pay out for vacation time 
earned. Theirs is a Use-It-Or-Lose-It policy. 
You are required by AutoZone to take your 
vacation time or lose the monies accrued for 
vacation. No company can tell me how I 
have to use the money I have earned for 
performance under any contract. They are 
not my legal guardians, nor can that act as 
such. My money is mine to use as I see fit 
and AutoZone cannot tell me I have to take 
a vacation or lose the monies earned for 
vacation. That is Breach-OfContract and 
Theft-Of-Services under the contract laws 
of the State of Utah and U.S. Law. 
{Emphasis in original) Juricic Depo. at p. 47, line 5 to p. 48, line 4; p. 74, line 
15 to p. 75; line 13. R. at 38, 73-74, 93-94, R. at 191-198. 
17. Juricic voluntarily chose to stay employed with AutoZone, 
even though he did not agree with the AutoZone use-it-or-lose-it vacation time 
policy. Juricic Depo. at p. 46, line 22 to p. 47, line 4; p. 78, line 18 to p. 79, 
line 15. R. at 39, 72-73, 97-98. 
AutoZonefs Policy Prohibiting Work After Hours for a Competitor 
18. From the time Juricic started working with AutoZone, or 
shortly thereafter, AutoZone has had a policy prohibiting employees from 
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working for AutoZone competitors after hours and off premises. Juricic Depo. 
at p. 42, lines 7-10; p. 42, line 23 to p. 43, line 3. R. at 39, 68-69, R. at 239-
241. 
19. A full and complete description of why Juricic believes 
AutoZone's restriction on moonlighting is improper is m papers he drafted, 
which read as follows: 
Conflicts. 
I may not participate in any enterprise in 
competition with AutoZone. AutoZone 
does not own me, nor do they have an 
exclusive contract with me or my time. I am 
an independent contractor that sells my time 
to whomever I choose. AutoZone does not 
have the right to restrict my selling my time 
to whomever I choose. I am not owned by 
them. Involuntary Servitude and Slavery are 
forbidden by law. They cannot control my 
time when I am not employed at AutoZone. 
Page 36. Conflicts of interest. You may not 
participate in any enterprise in competition 
with AutoZone. Right. They own you and 
all your time. They can regulate any of your 
time, even whe [sic] you are not being paid 
by AutoZone. All your time is theirs to 
regulate as they see fit. Wrong. I am not 
the property of AutoZone. I am an 
independent contractor of my time, and I 
choose whom I will sell it to, not AutoZone. 
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They cannot take away my rights to be 
employed as I see fit simply by making a 
regulation in an employment contract. That 
right does not exist. Again, I cannot be 
legally compelled to submit to or perform 
illegal acts. My time is mine to do with as I 
see fit. 
{Emphasis in original) Juricic Depo. at p. 47, line S to p. 48, line 4; p. 79, line 
16 top. 80, line 12. R. at 39-40, 73-74, 98-99, R. at 191-198. 
20. Although Juricic does not agree with it, he understands 
that a prohibition on working for a competitor may have legitimate business 
purposes such as protecting trade secrets and avoiding confusion for 
customers. Juricic voluntarily chose to stay employed with AutoZone for 
many years after he learned about the AutoZone restriction on moonlighting 
policy even though he did not agree with such policy. Juricic Depo. at p. 46, 
line 22 to p. 47, line 4; p. 83, line 19 to p. 84, line 24; p. 87, line 21 to p. 88, 
line 4. R. at 40-41, 72-73, 101, 104-105. 
21. While working at AutoZone, Juricic did not ever apply 
for, receive or decline a job offer from a competitor of AutoZone. Instead, he 
opted to work as much overtime as he could at AutoZone stores and thus he 
probably made more money on overtime pay than he would have made 
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working for a competitor after his AutoZone work hours were completed. 
Juricic Depo at p. 84, line 25 to p. 85, line 23. R. at 40-41, 102-103. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Juricic contends that AutoZone's dress code does rise to the level of 
AutoZone requiring its employees to wear uniforms, which obligates AutoZone to 
furnish such uniforms to its employees free of charge (or to reimburse employees for 
the cost they incur to purchase such uniforms). Mr. Juricic also contends that 
AutoZone's policy relating to accruing and using or losing vacation hours/pay is 
contrary to Utah law. Finally, Mr. Juricic contends that AutoZone's policy restricting 
its employees from engaging in income earning activities while not on company time 
or company premises is contrary to Utah law. Thus, Mr. Juricic contends the trial 
court's decisions on these three questions are erroneous as a matter of law. 
The instant appeal tests the limits of what an employer can require an 
employee to do during work hours and on company premises and after work hours 
and off company premises. Mr. Juricic's concerns and this instant appeal are neither 
frivolous or unimportant. The Court's decision will potentially affect hundreds of 
employers and many thousands of employees in Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
L AUTOZONEyS DRESS CODE MANDATES THE 
WEARING OF A UNIFORM. 
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No Utah statute requires an employer to pay for the cost of employee 
uniforms if the employer requires its employees to wear uniforms. However, the Utah 
Labor Commission has issued a regulation/rule defining when an employees dress 
code rises to the level of requiring the wearing of a uniform and when an employer 
must pay for uniforms it requires its employees to wear. The instant appeal involves 
the interpretation of that regulation. 
The regulation at issue, Utah Administrative Code R610-3-21, provides 
that if an employer requires an employee to wear articles of clothing, footwear or 
accessory "of a distinctive design or color," such constitutes being a uniform, which 
the employer must then furnish to the employee free of charge. 
The parties agreed that AutoZone requires its employees to wear 
clothing of a distinctive design and color (AutoZone does not currently require such 
clothing to bear an emblem or logo). The parties disagreed as to whether this dress 
code of requiring employees to wear clothing of a distinctive design and color 
constitutes the requirement of wearing a uniform. Accordingly, Mr. Juricic sought 
declaratory relief as to whether the AutoZone policy mandating employees to comply 
with a dress code which requires them to wear clothing of a specific design and color 
is tantamount to AutoZonefs requiring its employees to wear uniforms. 
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The trial court concluded (on AutoZone!s motion for summary 
judgment) that the AutoZone's policy which requires employees to wear clothing of a 
certain design and a specific color was not tantamount to the requiring of the wearing 
of a uniform. As set forth below, Mr. Juricic submits the trial court's conclusion that 
the AutoZone dress code does not mandate the wearing of a uniform is not correct. 
A policy which requires employees to wear clothing of a specific design 
and a specific color (in the instant case, a red golf shirt or red shirt with a collar and 
black pants, black socks, black shoes and a black belt), requires employees to wear 
clothing of a "distinctive design or color." Such a policy fits squarely within the 
coverage scheme of Utah Administrative Code R610-3-21. Thus, according to the 
operative regulation, such an employer policy imposes the requirement to wear a 
uniform. 
The issue is not whether an AutoZone employee can wear such clothes 
after work or off company premises or whether anyone on the street might recognize 
the employee wearing such clothing as an AutoZone employee. That is not the test 
which the rule sets forth. The issue is whether the employer requires the employee to 
wear clothing of a "distinctive design or color." In the instant case, AutoZone does. 
AutoZone's policy requires employees to wear clothing of a certain design and of a 
certain color. This policy requiring employees to wear clothing of a certain design 
18 
and a certain color requires wearing of clothing of a "distinctive design or color" so as 
to rise to the level of being a uniform. 
The trial court's conclusion of the law to the contrary is contrary to the 
determinative regulation and should be reversed. 
II. AUTOZONE'S VACATION POLICY VIOLATES UTAH 
LAW ON ACCRUAL AND PAYMENT OF WAGES. 
Utah law does not require employers to provide employees with 
vacation days (or policies on vacations in any sense). However, the Utah Labor 
Commission had adopted regulations/rules which provide that if a Utah employer 
does establish a policy permitting employees to earn paid vacation days (or hours), 
such vacation days (or hours) are considered part of an employees wages. Utah 
Administrative Code Rule 610-3-4 (B) (1). 
The parties agreed that AutoZone has a policy which provides that 
employees may earn vacation hours/days but which also requires employees who can 
earn vacation days to use those vacation days during a given year or risk losing many 
of such vacation hours or days. The parties disagreed as to whether such a policy 
violated Utah law. Accordingly, Mr. Juricic sought declaratory relief as to whether 
AutoZone's use-it-or-lose-it policy on vacation days is consistent or inconsistent with 
Utah law. 
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The trial court concluded (on motion for summary judgment) that 
AutoZonefs policy which obligates employees who accrue vacation days to use them 
or lose them did not violate Utah law. As set forth below, Mr. Juricic submits the 
trial court's conclusion is not correct. 
A use-it-or-we-will-take-it-away-from-you policy does violate the Utah 
statutory and regulatory scheme on payment of wages and benefits. 
The Utah statutory law on payment of wages, see Utah Code Annotated 
§ 34-28-1 et. seq., provides that if an employer has a policy which requires employees 
to have to work in order to earn wages and if the employer then has those employees 
work but does not pay those employees the wages they have earned, such a practice 
violates Utah law. If an employer has a policy which provides employees with the 
means to earn vacation days, then such vacation days are considered part of the 
employee's overall package of "wages.11 By extension and extrapolation, Mr. Juricic 
contends that an employer cannot then erase or reduce any part of such a wage 
package, those "wages," without paying the employee for the value of such earned 
benefits. Mr. Juricic contends that if an employee has worked so as to earn vacation 
days, his employer cannot take those vacation days away from him without giving 
him fair value therefor. 
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The trial court's conclusion of law to the contrary is contrary to the 
determinative statute and regulation and should be reversed. 
III. AUTOZONEfS ANTI MOONLIGHTING POLICY IS 
IMPROPER UNDER UTAH LAW. 
Utah law appears to be silent on how far an employer can go to regulate 
the off hours and off premises conduct of its employees. Mr. Juricic contends that 
such silence is not a license on the part of the employer to control what an employee 
can or cannot do in his own time in terms of working and earning income. 
Mr. Juricic recognizes that an employer has the right to regulate the 
actions, attitude and activities of an employee while an employee is on the clock, on 
the employer's premises and doing the employer's business. However, an employer's 
right to regulate an employee's private life has limits, especially when the employee is 
off the clock and off the employer's premises. 
The parties agreed that AutoZone has a policy which prohibits an 
employee while off the clock and off the employer's premises from working for a 
competitor. The parties disagreed as to whether such a prohibition violated Utah law. 
Accordingly, Mr. Juricic sought declaratory relief as to whether the 
AutoZone policy restricting for whom an employee can work after hours and off 
premises is consistent or inconsistent with Utah law. 
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The trial court concluded (in adjudicating AutoZone's motion for 
sumnury judgment) that AutoZone's policy on moonlighting did not violate Utah law. 
As set forth below, Mr. Juricic submits the trial court's conclusion is not correct. 
Mr. Juricic acknowledges that the principle that an employee has a duty 
of loyalty to his employer is a valid legal proposition but he does challenge how far 
that duty extends. 
At issue is whether an employer can dictate what an ordinary blue collar 
sales clerk can do after hours on his own time and off premises. Mr. Juricic does 
stubbornly insist that his time after hours and off premises is his own time to use 
however he wishes and that if he wants to earn a little money on the side, he ought to 
be able to do so, even if that moonlighting is in the store of a competitor. 
Mr. Juricic is simply contending that if a rank-and-file, hourly employee 
wants to work for AutoZone during the day and wants to earn some extra money at 
night (or weekends) by working for "Acme Autoparts," he ought to be able to do so 
and AutoZone should not be able to stop him from doing so. 
Mr. Juricic was not an owner of AutoZone or a product development 
engineer for or even a mechanic for AutoZone. He was an auto parts sales clerk. He 
sold motor oil, spark plugs, windshield wipers, batteries, etc. We are dealing with a 
blue collar worker who might choose to try to earn some extra money. If such an 
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individual has some knowledge and experience in the auto parts industry, why 
shouldn't he be able to work for a competitor, after hours and off premises? 
Presumably, antifreeze or headlights for a certain car differs little from auto parts 
chain to auto parts chain. AutoZone provided no evidence to the trial court that 
allowing a blue collar employee such as Mr. Juricic to work for a competitor on his 
own time would cost AutoZone one dime in lost sales or that it would confuse any 
potential customer or siphon off one existing AutoZone customer from AutoZone. 
The trial court's conclusion of law to the contrary is contrary to the free 
right of an employee to contract with whomever he wishes to contract with to provide 
his services and to earn income. 
IV. MR. JURICIC'S ACCEPTANCE AND CONTINUANCE 
OF EMPLOYMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ACCEPTANCE OF 
AUTOZONE'S TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT. 
The employment relationship is fundamentally a matter of contract. It 
may rarely be the subject of a written, integrated instrument (particularly with respect 
to blue collar workers) but the nature of the legal relationship is contractual. An 
employee agrees to work for an employer. The employer agrees to pay the employee, 
furnish a workplace which is hopefully safe and hopefully in compliance with all 
other federal and state laws regulating the workplace. The employment relationship 
consists of a bundle of mutual, contractually based rights and obligations. One, but 
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only one, of these rights is the presumption tl mt tl le cli iratioi 1 of the relationship cai i be 
ended by either party at will. 
Mr. Juricic contends that the presumption of at-will employment does 
not mean that an at-will employee who continues to work for an employer accepts 
without reservation, ratifies, and cannot seek declaratory relief as to : - ue of 
the other terms of the employment/contractual relationship may be improper or 
violative of Utah law. If there is a contract in existence, as there was in the instant 
case, then, even if that employer (or employee) can terminate that employment at will, 
an employee's continuing employment with the employer should not IK: a ban to being 
able to ask for declaratory relief as to matters in the contract in controversy. Even 
with at-will employment, there are limits and exceptions. Likewise, there should be 
limits to any presumption that an employee who continues to work for the employer 
accepts every policy the employer adopts without being able to question the same. 
Of course, if an employee does not like an employer's policies, such 
employee need not stay employed with that particular employer and may choose to 
seek employment with some other employer whose policies he finds more consistent 
with his particular preferences. But in the "real world," employees are tied into their 
employers by a dozen "strings": dependence on a paycheck, receiving group health 
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insurance, involvement in retirement plans, development of specialized skills, and 
high unemployment rates, to name a few of the most obvious "strings." 
In order to seek declaratory relief, Mr. Juricic should not have had to 
sever his employment relationship with AutoZone. There was a contract in place 
which may serve as the basis for a civil action seeking declaratory relief, just as any 
other contract. 
V. NONE OF MR. JURICICS CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY 
APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS. 
Mr. Juricic sought declaratory judgment as to certain terms and 
conditions of what had been an ongoing contractual employment relationship. 
The employment practices at issue were ongoing and continuing. Mr. 
Juricic needed to buy clothing every year, not just when he began employment 10 or 
11 years ago. Likewise, every time Mr. Juricic accrued vacation hours/days and had 
to use them so as not to lose them, another controversy arose as to which he could 
seek declaratory relief. Similarly, whenever Mr. Juricic was dissuaded from going to 
work after hours for another auto parts store, because of AutoZone's policy against 
moonlighting with a competitor, there was a new violation and a new dispute arose 
and a new statute of limitations began to run. 
In essence, Mr. Juricic was claiming a "continuing violation." This 
concept is not unlike the proposition which has developed in employment 
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discrimination law. See Weeks v. New York State (Division of Parole), 273 F.3d 76, 
82 (2nd Cir. 2001) and National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 
(2002) rejecting the doctrine of continuing violations under Title VII for "discrete 
actions" but upholding it for hostile environment cases and possibly "pattern or 
practice" claims. Mi Juricicfs claims relate to an ongoing relationship, filled with 
alleged patterns and practices, a continuing violation, fully actionable and not barred 
by statutes of limitations. 
A SHORT CONCLUSION STATING THE PRECIS*. K K\M< i< 
SOUGHT 
Many, if not most, employees do not concern themselves with the 
concerns with which Mr. Juricic concerned himself. But this does not mean that Mr. 
Juricic's concerns are frivolous or not important. 
His concerns deal squarely with a very important 
relationship-employment-and how far that relationship extends into non-employment 
life-how far can an employer go to regulate an employee's dress, wages and off-duty, 
off-premises conduct? 
An employer has every right to expect that if it is going to have 
employees work and pay them for their work, that such employees should work hard 
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during their shifts and be loyal. But that obligation ends or at least tapers off when 
the employee clocks out and walks out the front door. 
If an employer can regulate and dictate for whom an employee can 
work (or not work) on his own time or what an employee can say or do on his own 
time, what is to stop an employer from controlling other aspects of an employee's life 
which the owners of the company or corporation determine they may want to control. 
It is a slippery slope. Mr. Juricic does not want the slope to get any "slipperier." 
There are some checks and balances already in place. If the employer 
believes the employee has abused an employee's freedom, the employer can discharge 
the employee. But an employer should not be able to wield the power of the state 
(through the courts) to sanction abridging the freedom of an ordinary 
employee/citizen to work and earn wages he can then enjoy whenever he wants to do 
without fear of losing what he has earned or abridging the freedom of an ordinary 
employee/citizen to work and earn wages in any legitimate enterprise after hours and 
off premises. 
DATED this JJ_ <% of November, 2009. 
David J. Holdswo 
Attorney for Appellant 
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I hereby certify that on this /cjaky of November, 2009, a true, correct 
and complete copy of the foregoing APPELLANTS OPENING BRIEF was 
delivered upon the attorney(s) indicated below by the method(s): 
Facsimile 
^ U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Delivery 
Michael Patrick O'Brien, Esq. 
Mark D. Tolman, Esq. 
Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main, Suitel500 
P.O. Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0444 
l/\^c/ d& A 
David Juricic 
8504 S McKenzie Lane 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
£/J - AW,// 
David J. Iiold^wortlr 
p Original (to be filed with the Utah Court of Appeals) by hand delivery 
this / * day of November, 2009, to: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Clerk of the Court 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
David L Holdsworth 
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ADDENDUM TO THE BRIEF: 
(A) ANY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTE, 
REGULATION OR RULE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE CITED IN THE BRIEF 
BUT NOT PRODUCED VERBATIM IN THE BRIEF: 
None. 
(B) ANY COURT OPINION OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO 
THE APPEAL BUT NOT AVAILABLE TO THE COURT AS PART OF A 
REGULARLY PUBLISHED REPORTER SERVICE: 
See the trial court's memorandum decision produced herewith. 
(C) THOSE PARTS OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL THAT ARE 
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL: 
None. 
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IN THE D.STR.CT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID C. JURICIC .
 B.r— ~ 
' • MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AUTOZONE, INC., 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. 070915977 
DATE: JANUARY 3, 2009 
The Court has received a Notice to Submit for Decision, filed December 1, 2008. 
concerning the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The motion has been fully 
briefed, and neither party requested oral argument. Accordingly, the Court may 
proceed with a determination of the motion. For the reasons set forth herein, the 
motion is GRANTED. 
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the "pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 56( c). '"A genuine issue of 
fact exists where, on the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ' 
1 
on any materia, issue." Ron
 Shepard Ins., ,nc. , Shie,ds, 8 8 2 P . 2 d 6 5 0 , 6 5 5 ( ^ 
1994). ,„ considering the motion, the Court must "view the facts and a., reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorabie to the non-moving party" earner 
v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, U 3, 104 P.3d 1208. 
Here, the statement of facts set forth in the Defendant's motion is undisputed, 
and the Plaintiff has not asserted additional relevant facts. Accordingly, the Court 
accepts the facts as stated by the Defendant. 
With respect to the legal analysis, the Court concludes that the Defendant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, the Defendant's dress code policy 
does not constitute a uniform, and accordingly, the Plaintiff is not entitled to claim 
reimbursement for the cost of the clothes which allegedly were a uniform. The 
Defendant's "use-it-or-lose it" vacation policy is permissible under Utah law, inasmuch 
as an employer in its discretion may set conditions upon the benefits it provides. The 
Defendant's conflict of interest policy is also permissible under Utah law: an employer 
can refuse to continue to employ someone who works for a competitor. The 
Defendant's communications policy is similarly permissible under Utah law. The Court 
notes that the Plaintiff has cited no contrary authority. 
Having made the foregoing determinations, the Court need not reach the issue 
of whether the Plaintiff's continued employment constituted acceptance of the terms 
and conditions imposed by the Defendant. Similarly, it need not reach the statute of 
limitations claim, nor the mootness argument. 
Counsel for the Defendants is directed to prepare a proposed form of judgment, 
counsel for the Plaintiff, and to submit it to the Court after an appropriate serve it upon 
2 
'
n t e r r a
" ~ « ° R"<e 7. U<ah R u l e s o f C j v i 1 p r 0 c e d u r e . 
Dated this_ff§ay ofDi WMMou 2009. 
^ & ^ 5 L 
KATE A. TOO,.-,^., 
DISTRICT COl/^T' 
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Attorney DEF 
170 S MAIN ST STE 1500 
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84101-1644 
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u M. 
Deputy dburt Clerk 
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Michael Patrick O'Brien (USB #4894) 
Mark D. Tolman (USB#10793) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Post Office Box 45444 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0444 
Telephone: (801)521-3200 
By. 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 1 5 2009 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
"" Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID C. JURICIC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AUTOZONE, INC., 
Defendant. 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 070915977 
Judge Kate Toomey 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted by the court in a 
Memorandum Decision dated January 3, 2009. The court having entered its order granting 
summary judgment and directing the entry of final judgment; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs 
Complaint against Defendant be dismissed with prejudice and that judgment be entered in 
favor of Defendant on the merits for the reasons stated in the court's Memorandum Decision 
dated January 3,2009. This Judgment is final pursuant to Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, as to all of Plaintiff s claims against Defendant. 
87I629vl 
1$. DATED this  s day of January, 2009. 
BY THE COURT 
-4\ 
A.. Totfme}* 
Kate A. 
Third Distnct Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
David Jf Holdsworth 
Attorneys for Plafatiff 
JQNES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Michael Patrick O'Brien 
Mark D. Tolman 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the of January, 2009,1 caused to be sent by first 
class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINAL JUDGEMENT 
to the following: 
David J. Holdsworth 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
9125 South Monroe Plaza Way, Suite C 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
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